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CALL FOR STANDARDIZATION IN PATENT CLAIM
DRAFTING
Tao Zhang,† Daniel J. Sherwinter,‡ & Dov Greenbaum§
The United States patent system has become a less favorable
IP protection regime for inventors due to, among other factors, the
widespread assertion of poor quality patents by patent assertion
entities, a high percentage of invalidities by the USPTO PTAB under
the new inter parties review system, and the resulting uncertainty in
patent value and validity. Although a number of solutions have been
suggested in the literature, only a truly transparent system will return
the patent system to one that promotes invention and maintains U.S.
leadership in innovation. Not only does the proposed tool described
herein provide that transparency, it is also an effective tool in fighting
patent trolls and raising the quality of patents. Employing artificial
intelligence, natural language processing, and machine learning, the
tool creates a patent system of standardized claim syntax and format
and a patent system that promotes easy-to-understand, easy-to-parse
and easy-to-assess patent claims.

† Tao Zhang is a senior director of IP Strategy at Huawei Device USA, Inc.
‡ Daniel J. Sherwinter is a Senior Patent Attorney with Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP.
§ Dov Greenbaum is Director at the Zvi Meitar Institute for Legal Implications of Emerging
Technologies and Associate Professor in the Department of Molecular Biophysics and
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The views expressed herein are opinions of the authors and do not represent those of the authors’
past or current employers.
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INTRODUCTION
The patent system has lost much of its luster as a mechanism for
propelling innovation.1 In particular, over the past few years, the U.S.
patent system has become a significantly less favorable incentive
pathway for inventors and innovators.2 This is especially the case for
disillusioned high-tech companies that have become frustrated with
ever-expanding thickets of qualitatively poor patents3 (particularly
within the software space)4 that are increasingly asserted by newly
aggressive plaintiffs.5
Many of these plaintiffs are non-practicing entities (“NPEs”),
arguably, a subset of patent assertion entities (“PAEs”)—both
colloquially known as trolls—who have forced new ground rules into
the litigation game. According to at least one dataset, 20% of all patent
litigation in 2017 was associated with plaintiffs that had acquired (i.e.,
not invented in-house, but rather purchased specifically to use
offensively) the asserted patent.6 Others have suggested that the
numbers, while falling from prior years, may have been as high as 60%
1. See Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328
(2015).
2. See Leonid Kravets, Do Patents Really Matter to Startups?, TECHCRUNCH (June 21,
2012), http://bit.do/Kravets_do-patents (noting that “[o]ne third of all funded companies have
filed a patent application. 19% of all funded companies filed at least one patent application prior
to receiving any funding [and] [s]ince 2005, the average start-up has become less likely to apply
for patents than companies founded in the previous year.”). See also Daniel Hoenig & Joachim
Henkel, Quality signals? The Role of Patents, Alliances, and Team Experience in Venture Capital
Financing, 44 RES. POL’Y, 1049 (2015) (Venture capital seems “to appreciate patents only in their
productive functions as property rights, not as signals of technology quality.”); Hanna Hottenrott,
Bronwyn H. Hall & Dirk Czarnitzki, Patents as Quality Signals? The Implications for Financing
Constraints on R&D, 25 ECON. INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 197, 217 (2016) (“[W]e find that the
patent signaling effect does not seem to arise in larger firms and . . . that the effect on external
financing tends to be driven by the mere presence of patents rather than observable ex post
indicators of the value of those inventions.”).
3. See Ronald A. Cass, Patent Litigants, Patent Quality, and Software: Lessons from the
Smartphone Wars, 16 MINN. J.L., SCI . & TECH. 1 (2015).
4. See generally Arti K. Rai, Improving (Software) Patent Quality Through the
Administrative Process, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 503 (2013); Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software
Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 325 (2012) (Arguably, this could also be due to the reality that at the
same time that patent thickets have been confounding freedom to operates assessments, the courts
have been simultaneously confounding the ability to actually obtain new software patents.); see
also Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern., 573 U.S. 189 (2014).
5. Seemingly, the mutually-assured destruction that prevented large companies from
suing other companies is no longer a strategy. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner,
Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (2005); Eli Dourado, How Patent Privateers Have
Eroded Mutually Assured Destruction in the Computer Industry, THE ÜMLAUT (Oct. 2, 2013),
http://bit.do/Dourado_patent-privateers.
6. Shawn P. Miller et al., Introduction to the Stanford NPE Litigation Dataset, (Oct. 23,
2017) (unpublished manuscript).
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in 2017.7 Importantly, it is not just the number of patent cases, but also
the way they are handled; NPEs are not hindered by the (former) reality
that legal adversaries today may be business partners tomorrow,
negating the need to play fair.8
What we can surmise is that, in many instances, NPEs have
arguably asserted patents in irresponsible and often unpredictable ways
that seem to serve only to shake down non-competitors.9 This is in stark
contrast to the litigation that occurred decades ago that aimed primarily
to protect market share by preventing important and key innovations
from being infringed by potential competitors.10 Most of today’s NPE
plaintiffs do not have market share; they just assert their patent
portfolios against any of the various stakeholders in the market.
Notably, this phenomenon is now prevalent in other, non-U.S.
jurisdictions as well.11
7. Timothy Au, U.S. Patent Litigation on Decline While PTAB Breaks Records and NPE
Settlement Amounts Fall, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 2, 2018), http://bit.do/Au_US-patent-litigation
(perhaps reflecting changes in the law relating to venue).
8. Stefan Wagner, Are ‘Patent Thickets’ Smothering Innovation?, YALE INSIGHTS (Apr.
22, 2015), http://bit.do/Wagner_Patent-thickets. See, e.g., John L. Turner, Patent Thickets, Trolls
and Unproductive Entrepreneurship 5-6 (Sept. 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
University of Georgia, Terry College of Business) (noting that “[a]mong non-NPE cases, the most
highly represented technology class is Drugs & Medical, at about 26%. Among NPE lawsuits,
however, less than 1% of lawsuits involve patents from this category. This suggests that the level
of invention in this industry is below the level needed to induce widespread troll behavior. On the
other hand, more than 77% of NPE cases involve Computers & Communications patents,
compared to about 22% in non-NPE cases. Here, troll behavior appears to be flourishing.”). But
cf. Robin Feldman, Tom Ewing, & Sara Jeruss, The AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects Of Patent
Monetization Entities, 17 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 110-11 (2013) (“The study can tell us that there is
a lot of patent litigation being filed by monetizers, that the amount has increased rapidly over the
last five years, and that it appears to be continuing to increase. The study cannot identify the
reasons for the increase in monetization, determine whether the level of litigation by patent
monetizers is problematic, and if so, identify the solutions to that problem.”).
9. David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in
the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 455 (2013) (“The bigger picture, and the better
question, is whether the lawsuits are being brought because the defendants are infringers of a valid
patent or whether the defendants are merely easy targets for a nuisance law-suit.”). See also EonNet LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1326-27 (9th Cir. 2011) (In particular, the district
court found that Eon-Net's case against Flagstar had ‘indicia of extortion’ because it was part of
Eon-Net's history of filing nearly identical patent infringement complaints against a plethora of
diverse defendants, where Eon-Net followed each filing with a demand for a quick settlement at
a price far lower than the cost to defend the litigation. The record supports the district court's
finding that Eon-Net acted in bad faith by exploiting the high cost to defend complex litigation to
extract a nuisance value settlement from Flagstar.”).
10. See, e.g., Edward Lee, Patent Trolls: Moral Panics, Motions in Limine, and Patent
Reform, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 113 (2015) (detailing both academic supporters and opponents
of NPEs).
11. The Rise of Non-Practicing Entity (NPE) Cases Outside the United States, DARTS-IP
http://bit.do/Darts-ip_Rise-NPE; Michael Platzöder, NPE Patent Litigation in Germany: Recent
Trends and Strategies, LEXOLOGY, (Oct. 12, 2016) (noting that while “[t]raditionally, patent
litigation initiated by non-practising entities (NPE) has focused predominantly on the U.S.
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These assertions lead to, among other externalities, uncertainty in
patent value, an erosion of protectable patent rights, a cheapening (not
in actual dollars, but in its relevance) of the patent litigation process,
and growing impediments to research and entrepreneurial efforts due
to actual or threatened excessive lawsuits and their resulting high
litigation costs.12 As a result, there is mounting sentiment among those
various stakeholders at greatest risk of falling prey to NPEs that the
patent system has failed inventors, and now hinders innovation.13 Many
companies, especially cash-strapped startups, are appreciably cutting
back, or even foregoing, patenting altogether (seeing them as primarily
a negative tool), or looking to operate in areas where patent
enforcement is weak and the threat of speculative litigation by NPEs is
less.14
Again, this is not how things once were: patents are intended to
promote innovation. Optimally, a patent should provide a limited
monopoly to an innovator as a quid pro quo for disclosing their
innovations to the public.15 In an effort to balance further follow-on
innovation and the innovation associated with the patent itself, patent
systems were designed to cabin the scope of that limited monopoly
(i.e., the extent of the collective patent rights) to the specific claims
within the patents; everything else however was fair game. Like the
aforementioned destructive NPE litigation, this bargain between patent
owners and the public has become less helpful in promoting innovation
or protecting legitimate monopolies. Patents have evolved such that
their now often-opaque claim language is explicitly designed to, and
successfully used to, exceed this quid pro quo by allowing patentees to
post facto grab more than they actually disclosed.16 This is a reality that
is especially exploited by NPEs.
market,” there is now a shift to other markets due to changes in the U.S. patent system.).
12. Catherine E. Tucker et al., The Effect of Patent Litigation and Patent Assertion Entities
on Entrepreneurial Activity, 45 RES. POL’Y, 218, 231 (2016); Seokbeom Kwon & Kazuyuki
Motohashi, Effect of Non-Practicing Entities on Innovation Society and Policy: An Agent Based
Model and Simulation, IAM DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES #033 (“Our result concludes that the
negative effects of NPEs are likely to outweigh their potential benefits.”).
13. Turner, supra note 8; Time to Fix Patents, ECONOMIST (Aug. 8, 2015),
http://bit.do/TimetoFixPatents.
14. Yongwook Paik & Feng Zhu, The Impact of Patent Wars on Firm Strategy: Evidence
from the Global Smartphone Industry, 27 ORG. SCI. 1397, 1399 (2016).
15. See Jacob Adam Schroeder, Written Description: Protecting the Quid Pro Quo Since
1793, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 63 (2010).
16. See, e.g., Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (where the
plaintiffs claimed their patent read on essentially all e-commerce). See also id. at 1325
(“Moreover, Eon-Net's failure to engage the claim construction process in good faith was only
one of many instances of misconduct detailed by the district court. The district court also found
that Medina displayed a “lack of regard for the judicial system” and that Eon-Net and Medina had
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NPEs exploit some particular characteristics of the modern patent.
To wit: patent claims are, by common convention, inherently terse
collections of words.17 Arguably, patent claims are one of the most
complex and difficult to interpret collections of words in the legal
canon.18 Which words are chosen to describe an invention, how those
words are combined to form patent claims, and how those words are
eventually defined (e.g., in context of a litigation and other judicial
proceedings) will ultimately determine if a competitor’s product
infringes the granted patent or not.19 Thus, part of the operating risk
calculus of any firm that has good patent counsel will depend on the
uncertainty surrounding how future legal arbitrators will define both its
and its competitors’ patents.
As such, the value of a patent is inextricably tied to its semantics.
Given their inherent uncertainty, semantic ambiguities are especially
valuable in the patent space where they can be leveraged to expand the
scope of the patent monopoly beyond what might have been originally
appreciated by the inventor, or to circumvent new developments in
patent law.20
Stepping back, we are not equating talented patent wordsmiths
with the bad actors associated with NPEs. This opaqueness is not
necessarily nefarious, but rather a necessity of doing business, as
changes in patent law are retroactive without grandfathering in already
allowed patents. With both legal and technological innovations
hanging as swords of Damocles above each patent, patent drafters have
to be creative. Patents must be prosecuted today to be robust in light of
unknowable statutory, regulatory, judicial, and technological changes
tomorrow. Arguably, to not do so could be construed as malpractice.
a “cavalier attitude” towards the “patent litigation process as a whole.”).
17. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
18. Simon Mille & Leo Wanner, Making Text Resources Accessible to the Reader: The
Case of Patent Claims, INT’L LANGUAGE RESOURCES & EVALUATION CONF. PROC. 1393, 1393
(2008).
19. See, e.g., Shawn P. Miller, “Fuzzy” Software Patent Boundaries and High Claim
Construction Reversal Rates, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 809, 811 (2014) (citing JAMES BESSEN ET
AL., PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK
141 (2008)) (Noting that “owners and producers cannot be certain of the legal scope of any patent
until the Federal Circuit has spoken.”).
20. For example, via the doctrine of equivalents. See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v.
Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co.,
520 U.S. 17, 36 (1997); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558,
619 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“A primary justification for the [doctrine of equivalents] is to accommodate
after-arising technology. Without the [doctrine of equivalents], any claim drafted in current
technological terms could be easily circumvented after the advent of an advance in technology.”);
see also Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law's Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 1, 36-37 (2009) (outlining the fairness justifications for the doctrine of equivalents).
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However, these realities also make novelty point identification, prior
art searches, and patent comparison difficult or even unfeasible—and
these factors are exploited by less-than-good actors.
For example, though the purpose of patent claims is to define the
scope of an innovation, patent claims are typically written in a manner
that is rife with obfuscation, full of subtle attempts to exploit or avoid
legal precedent and future legal and technological uncertainty. Further
confounding the system is the reality that most patents are drafted in
highly inconsistent forms depending on the drafters, their clients, and
myriad other factors, knowable and unknowable.
Professor Duffy highlights an ironic example as to how the current
system dramatically fails to limit the negative externalities of these
ambiguities. This is due to the nature of the courts to generally accept
those ambiguities in patent claims.21 Notably, the general acceptance
of these ambiguities within the patent system and by its gatekeepers—
the courts (further ironically, itself the result of inherently ambiguous
legislation)22—are arguably a failure of the characteristic notice
function23 of patents.
But it gets worse: bad patent actors bask in those ambiguities24
and in the imprecise terminology of many patents that lacks reasonable
certainty to exploit those ambiguities beyond what normative patent
law had accepted. These bad actors use those ambiguities to extract
rents from any innovator that can be caught in their dragnets, taxing

21. John F. Duffy, Counterproductive Notice in Literalistic versus Peripheral Claiming,
96 B.U. L. REV. 1197, 1199 (“Spending vast resources to find a supposedly precise and correct
interpretation of claims, only to have that interpretation lead to the invalidation of the claims, is
not merely wasteful but also counterproductive. If there is a justification for spending millions of
dollars during years of litigation to find the correct interpretation of a patent claim, that
justification must be that such litigation might lead, in the future, to better and more certain notice
of property rights”) (describing the protracted and circuitous litigation in Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v.
Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
22. Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(Gajarsa, J., concurring) (“In my judgment, the text of § 112, ¶ 1 is a model of legislative
ambiguity. The interpretation of the statute, therefore, is one over which reasonable people can
disagree, and indeed, reasonable people have so disagreed for the better part of a decade.”).
23. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002) (“A patent holder should know what he owns,
and the public should know what he does not.”).
24. Although some have argued that the nature of language inherently also creates
ambiguities, without the intention of bad actors. See, e.g., Amir H. Khoury, The “Unlimitless”:
On How to Remedy the Inadequacies of a Language-Based System for Patent Claims, 24 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 103, 129 (2016).
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innovation. This is especially the case in the area of software,25 where
definiteness26 is sorely lacking and NPEs are active.27
The concern of ambiguities and all of its repercussions is not
novel; it is a longstanding issue within patent law.28 The United States
Patent Office explicitly tied the reforming of claim language to the
improvement of patent quality,29 itself a nebulous quantity.30
All this handwringing regarding the legitimate and illegitimate
use of ambiguities notwithstanding, it is our contention that good patent
actors generally abhor using such ambiguities and the realities those
ambiguities have created, even with all of their associated legitimate
benefits. Rather, innovative companies and investors would prefer, or
at least benefit greatly from, the legal clarity of better-defined patent
rights arising from better-defined claim language—i.e., rights that are
stronger and more certain, even if potentially narrower in scope.31
To this end, we believe that a vibrant and transparent patent
system, e.g., where all parties and stakeholders each share the same
understanding of the scope of each patent, and its exacting metes and
bounds, will return the patent system to one that promotes innovation,
maintains United States leadership in technological developments, and
advances world–changing technologies.32 This is particularly true in
25. Arti K. Rai, Improving (Software) Patent Quality Through the Administrative Process,
51 HOUS. L. REV. 503, 505 (2013).
26. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2013).
27. See Sona Karakashian, A Software Patent War: The Effects of Patent Trolls on Startup
Companies, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship, 11 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 119, 155 (2015).
28. Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573 (1876) (“The genius of the inventor . . . should
not be restrained by vague and indefinite descriptions of claims in existing patents from the
salutary and necessary right of improving on that which has already been invented.”).
29. MPEP § 2173 (9th ed. Rev. 8, Jan. 2018) (“Optimizing patent quality by providing
clear notice to the public of the boundaries of the inventive subject matter protected by a patent
grant fosters innovation and competitiveness. Accordingly, providing high quality patents is one
of the agency’s guiding principles. The Office recognizes that issuing patents with clear and
definite claim language is a key component to enhancing the quality of patents and raising
confidence in the patent process.”); see United States Patent & Trademark Office 2010-2015
Strategic Plan, USPTO (2010), http://bit.do/USPTO_2010-2015-Strategic.
30. Christi J. Guerrini, Defining Patent Quality, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3091, 3096 (2014).
See, e.g., James E. Malackowski & Jonathan A. Barney, What is Patent Quality? A Merchant
Banc’s Perspective, 43 LES NOUVELLES 123, 124-28 (2008)
31. See, e.g., Soonwoo Hong, IP and Business: Quality Patents: Claiming what Counts,
WIPO MAG. (Feb. 2006), http://bit.do/Hong_IP-Business.
32. Matthew Herper, New Patent Law Would Trash Disease Cures, FORBES (March 24,
2015), http://bit.do/Herper_New-Patent-Law (“Weakening patent laws will decimate long-term
investment in cures for diseases such as Alzheimer's, Parkinson's, and Huntington's, as well as
funding for new therapies to treat autism and breast, colon, lymphoma and prostate cancer . . . Let
us be clear: investments in the biotech industry are based entirely on patents. Without strong
patents, we cannot raise money to find cures for disease.”). See also David Kline, Do Patents
Really Promote Innovation?, MICHELSON INST. FOR INTELL. PROP. (Apr. 24, 2017),
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today’s increasingly globalized economy, where information is readily
available at one’s fingertips regardless of those fingertips’ current
location.
We further believe that with a better patent system, inventors will
be motivated by the classical limited patent monopoly awarded to
innovators, when their efforts are adequately rewarded via an
enforceable monopolistic patent, even when that patent scope is
limited. Moreover, with a transparent patent system, those inventors
who may not have been previously motivated to patent may now find
use in patenting. Especially because a transparent patent system, with
well-defined terms, will eventually be a cheaper and more accessible
patent system for all stakeholders, at all levels of prosecution,
litigation, and licensing processes.
Why change the patent system? Maybe we should let it crumble
under its own bloated weight? Patents, when used properly and
effectively, can provide critical motivation and security to inventors,
and validation to their corresponding investors by creating protectable,
robust intellectual property rights. Consequently, proper patent
protection enables both innovation and essential third-party
investment.33
In sum, one of the main concerns voiced by stakeholders relates
to the opacity of patents and the scope of the claims: patents are valid
and potentially encompass their broadest possible scope, until they are
found to be invalid, and parties are often unwilling to settle patent
disputes until the courts construe the scope of their claims.34 Moreover,
the scope of that presumed valid patent is effectively indeterminable
until the patent is litigated, an admittedly increasingly rare
occurrence.35 And even when litigated, there is a more than 50% chance
http://bit.do/Kline_Do-Patents (citing the economists “Arrow (1962), Griliches (1963),
Schmookler (1966), Kitch (1977), Reinganum (1981), Klemperer (1990), Romer (1990), Giulbert
and Shapiro (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Scotchmer (1999), and Gallini (2002)”). But
cf. The Experts: Does the Patent System Encourage Innovation?, WALL ST. J. (May 16, 2013),
http://bit.do/WSJ_The-experts; Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Do Patents Help or
Hinder Innovation?, WORLD ECON. F. (May 14, 2013), http://bit.do/Galasso_Do-patents-help.
33. But cf. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Do Patents Stimulate R&D Investment and
Promote Growth?, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 13, 2018), http://bit.do/Bessen_Do-patents-stimulate
(“The evidence certainly is consistent with the notion that patents encourage American
pharmaceutical R&D. But otherwise, it is hard to find evidence suggesting patents are a major
factor spurring R&D investment, that patents contribute to economic growth, or even that the
patent system is a source of great wealth to important inventors and innovators (outside of a few
industries like pharmaceuticals)”).
34. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim
Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1745 (2009).
35. LEX MACHINA, Lex Machina Q4 2016 Litigation Update (Jan. 12, 2017),
http://bit.do/LexMachina_2016 (“Overall litigation in 2016 has declined by a moderate 22% from
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that the appellate court will modify the district court decision.36 Thus,
patent ambiguities that are there by design nevertheless prevent the
adequate assessment of a patent value and hinder the ability to predict
the outcome of patent litigation.
The proposed changes herein are non-trivial; interpreting claims
and cabining claim scope is a multi-factor problem. In this paper, we
discuss some of the factors driving poor patent quality resulting from
ambiguities and propose a solution—our Patents with Applied
Standardized Structure (PASS) approach—and some considerations
for promoting adoption of the proposed PASS approach.
I.

POOR PATENT QUALITY RESULTS FROM DIFFICULTIES
REGARDING CLAIM INTERPRETATION

Poor patent quality is a central concern for many stakeholders.37
Simply, poor patents result in patents that should not have been granted
in their current form. These types of patents are often an unappreciated
cost in innovation ecosystems, and at best, they might only create
unnecessary costs associated with licensing or threat of litigation. At
worst, they force companies to pivot or to stop innovation in that space
entirely.
Moreover, patent quality is an issue even when the patent is
deserved. Poorly drafted patents can be hard to parse by competitors or
are too broad or too narrow to optimally protect those innovations that
objectively deserve to be patented, creating costly confusion and
uncertainty amongst all relevant stakeholders.
All of the many actors in the patent pathway—from the inventors,
to their managers, to the patent attorneys, to the patent examiners, to
the relevant arbitrators—share the blame for the current state of
affairs.38 Their combined actions have made it nearly unachievable for
competing innovators, investors, patent litigation juries, and others to
accurately construe claim terms and ultimately their scope. As a result

2015”).
36. Chris Barry, Ronen Arad, Landan Ansell, Meredith CarTier & HyeYun Lee, PWC
2016
Patent
Litigation
Study,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
(May
2016),
http://bit.do/PWC_2016-patent.
37. Michelle K. Lee, Remarks at the Patent Quality Conference Keynote at the USPTO
(Dec. 13, 2016), http://bit.do/USPTO_Remarks-Lee. See also Peter S. Menell, A Method for
Reforming the Patent System, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 487, 506 (2007); Julie E.
Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual Property
Implications of “Lock-Out” Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1177–80 (1995).
38. See, e.g., Bruce Berman, Patent Quality—is a “Shared Responsibility,” Says IBM; It
Does Not Represent Invention Quality or IP Value, IP CLOSEUP (Mar. 26, 2015),
http://bit.do/Berman_Patent-quality.
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of the current system, a significant percentage of patents likely should
not have been granted and should not be enforceable.
We believe in the patent system and the underlying premise that
an idea that is both novel and nonobvious ought to be patentable, and
its royalty rents are justified as a promoter of innovation. However,
when a large number of poor-quality patents are granted (partially
because the situation described above often makes novelty point
identification, prior art searches, and patent comparison difficult or
even unfeasible at times), the quid pro quo balance of the patent system
is disrupted. Such patents fail to provide desirable public disclosure,
and instead tend to add to the aforementioned undesirable thickets and
rents for innovators. Any demands by patent holders for royalty
payment based on such poor-quality patents are not only unfair, but,
according to the accepted calculus of the patent system of one limited
monopoly per patent, actually inhibit innovation.
Demanding higher quality patents may not necessarily reduce the
number of patent applications or reduce the burden on overworked
examiners. It will, however, likely shrink the number of final allowable
patents. Higher quality patents are not just simply per se patentable,
they arguably have a determinable and definable scope. Those qualities
are also valuable to the system at large.
To reiterate: this is an important goal. The inherent difficulty
(particularly, a priori) in determining the quality of any particular
patent, and the assumption that many of those patents are of low
quality, can effectively cast a shadow over the quality of all patents,
thereby eroding the value of all patent rights and the ability of all
patents to provide incentives to real innovation.
Innovators can better avoid costs associated with pursuing
protection for innovations that would read on prior art and/or would
infringe extant patent rights, and examiners can devote more of their
limited time to innovations with a higher likelihood of patentability if
the patenting process was more standardized and the scope of patents
more predictable. Accordingly, one or more mechanisms for
standardizing patent claim drafting would help address many of the
root causes of poor patent quality.
Notably, optimizing patent claims through our proposed PASS
system is not only of relevance to competitors within related fields—
by making it easier to assess relevant patents in their fields—but it is
also useful in the context of the global patent examination process.
Giving examiners a better understanding of the scope of a patent
application enables a more reliable determination of whether a
particular innovation already exists within the prior art, which would
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increase examination quality and reduce examination time and costs
for all parties.
II.

THE PROPOSED PASS SOLUTION – STANDARDIZED
CLAIM FORMAT CONSISTING OF PRE-POPULATED KEY
TERMS LINKED BY CONNECTORS

We propose a two-tiered system for U.S. patent applications. The
First Tier would comprise the majority of drafted claims and would
require the implementation of standardized terminologies, as described
herein. These Tier-One patents would have an optimized claim
language with the express goal of clarity over opacity. The second tier
of patents would be a much smaller cohort (hopefully mostly legacy
claim sets) that for one reason or another are not yet standardized. Tier
Two patents would be incentivized to switch to the standardization of
Tier One patents but may not necessarily be wholly standardized. For
example, Tier One patents can receive discounts on official fees,
prioritized examination, an automated first Office Action, and/or other
benefits. In the alternative, new Tier Two patents would have to pay
additional fees to avoid the proposed system. An evaluation of such
benefits would be the focus of future study.
More specifically, in Tier One patents, each claim would be built
from a closed group of pre-defined elements where each element is
defined by one or more key terms semantically linked by connectors.
This idea of clearly defining claim terms is not entirely novel, Professor
Hal Wegner suggests that patents were intended to include a section
devoted to this need.39 Moreover, patentees are clearly within their
rights to set their own definitions for terms the Federal Circuit has
expressly allowed the patentee “to act as its own lexicographer [ . . . if
they] clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term' other than
its plain and ordinary meaning.”40
Granted, it is non-trivial to optimally build claims from an open
set of terms, all the more so from a limited set of terms. To this end,
key terms and their relevant connectors could be suggested to the
drafter by a machine learning algorithm that creates the claims based
on the description in the patent itself; this would be an iterative process.
As the description is modified, the claims would as well. Machines are

39. Letter from Harold C. Wegner to Hon. Michelle K. Lee, Under Secretary of Commerce,
USPTO 43 (June 3, 2015), http://bit.do/Wegner_Limelight, (blaming the USPTO for failing to
teach new practitioners how to adequately draft patents: “[i]n fact, passing the examination
requires zero practical patent drafting skills”).
40. Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm't Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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already capable of complex natural language processing,41 and moving
to the actual drafting of a claim is not a significant technical leap.42
Alternatively, claim drafters may also select terms from an extensive
but pre-populated pull-down menu (in a software program, or
otherwise metaphorical). In either case, the drafter would be
incentivized/forced to select from terms with well-(pre)defined
meaning. Each term would be associated with a clear and concise
glossary that lays out the metes and bounds of that term.
Patents are rarely truly totally novel (in the popular meaning of
the word) and it is likely that most drafters would be able to optimally
describe their invention from this closed set of terms. Still, when
necessary, patent drafters would be able to petition the USPTO to allow
additional terms, provided that they also provide a glossary for their
new or revised terminologies. A streamlined process would allow the
USPTO to quickly allow or deny the addition of a term to the closed
set of terms for each art. Once allowed, the new term would become
part of the lexicon, allowing other drafters to also use the term, when
necessary.
The process of introducing new terms into the closed set need not
necessarily be via the USPTO itself. Other members of the patent bar
could be given the chance to weigh in and comment on new proposed
terms, perhaps even incentivized through the gamification of the
process.43 Consider the popular Waze traffic application wherein traffic
notices provided by one user can be accepted or discarded by other
users within the network. Seniority within the system would result in
weighting of the acceptance or discarding of terms, with more senior
participants carrying more weight. Like the Waze app, the inputs from
other users would not come with any remuneration for added activity
within the system. In the alternative, these peer gatekeepers could be
rewarded with discounts in the patenting process.
This effort is actually not too difficult to implement: many
professional patent drafters already employ a relatively closed set of
terms for each art, and a relatively consistent style in drafting their
41. See, e.g., Tom Young et al., Recent Trends in Deep Learning Based Natural Language
Processing, COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MAG. (2018).
42. See, e.g., Linda Andersson et al., The Portability of Three Types of Text Mining
Techniques Into the Patent Text Genre, in CURRENT CHALLENGES IN PATENT INFORMATION
RETRIEVAL 241 (Mihai Lupu et al. ed., 2d ed. 2017); Akihiro Shinmori et al., Patent Claim
Processing for Readability: Structure Analysis and Term Explanation, in 2003 ACL WORKSHOP
ON PAT. CORPUS PROCESSING PROC. 56; Yuen-Hsien Tseng et al., Text Mining Techniques for
Patent Analysis, 43 INFO. PROCESSING & MGMT. 1216 (2007).
43. Jesús Eduardo et al., Gamification: An Effective Mechanism to Promote Civic
Engagement and Generate Trust?, in 8 INT’L CONF. ON THEORY & PRAC. ELECTRONIC
GOVERNANCE PROC. 514 (2014).

2018]

CALL FOR STANDARDIZATION

303

patents. Accordingly, for many, adoption of the proposed Tier One
standardized claiming would entrench, and even further refine, their
current practices while at the same time constraining only a minority
of peers at the tail-end by limiting the use of extraneous and less clearly
defined terms.
There are many advantages of such a standardized claim structure
for these Tier One patents, with pre-defined key terms connected by
pre-defined connectors, including the following:
a) It prompts patent attorneys to streamline claim drafting and
focus on the novelty points, while also mitigating obfuscation;
b) It enforces more disciplined selection of claim terms and
consistent usage of those terms throughout the claims,
specification, and drawings;
c) It enables easy prior art searching by the inventor or patent
drafter so that they can avoid wasting time on an idea not
worth pursuing;
d) It simplifies the patent examination process and thus assists
patent examiners to go through more cases with high quality
results;
e) It simplifies claim construction, allowing putative infringers
to have a better idea of the scope and nature of the claim;
f) It simplifies the drafting process to allow for the even the
iconic garage inventor to draft their own claims without the
need of professional counsel; and
g) Patent drafters can propose their own broadest reasonable
interpretation.44
III.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION – STRUCTURED PATENT CLAIM
DRAFTING UNDER PASS AND ASSOCIATED EXAMPLES

Even complicated claims can be simplified to key elements. As an
example, a simplified claim structure should look like the following,
with the key terms underlined and the prepositions or connectors in
parenthesis:
CLAIM 1:
(preposition0.1 or connector0.1) method, comprising:
term1.1 (connector1.1) term1.2 (connector 1.2)
term1.3;
44. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (“A claim in an unexpired patent that will not expire before
a final written decision is issued shall be given its broadest reasonable construction in light of the
specification of the patent in which it appears.”).
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term2.1 (connector2.1) term2.2 (connector 2.2)
term2.3; and
term3.1 (connector3.1) (connector 3.2) term3.2
(connector 3.3) term3.3.
When a claim is distilled down to the above bare-bone structure,
it becomes more transparent for patent drafters to figure out which step
is truly the novelty step, and it becomes extremely easy to perform prior
art searches. Of course, patent drafters may still prefer to include
additional adjectives, adverbs, or other modifiers to further refine each
term. These adjectives would have to be defined by the patentee as part
of the submission.
A. Example #1: A Method Claim
We’ll use an actual patent example, U.S. Patent 7,126,588,
“Multiple mode display apparatus,” to illustrate our proposal. Claim 1
reads as follows (with the key terms underlined and the prepositions or
connectors in parenthesis as illustrated above):
Claim 1:
(A) method comprising:
opening (a) first housing attached (with) (a) display device having
(a) first display area (and) (a) second display area;
uncovering (the) second display area (to) activate (the) second
display area;
closing (the) first housing over (the) display device (to) cover
(the) second display area (and) place (the) display device (in) (a) first
mode of reduced power consumption, wherein (the) first display area
is visible (and) is active; (and)
closing (a) second housing over (the) display device (to) cover
(the) first display area (and) (to) place (the) display device in (a) second
mode of reduced power consumption.
Using the Patent Deconstruction approach described in an IP
book, Mining Ideas for Diamonds, authored by Tao Zhang & Jingui
Fang,45 one can obtain a visual schematic for Claim 1 as shown in
Figure 1. In MINING IDEAS FOR DIAMONDS, typically square boxes
represent objects or nouns, elliptical shapes for actions, and single lined
arrows point from subjects to objects or simply connect the two through
45. TAO ZHANG & JINGUI FANG, MINING IDEAS FOR DIAMONDS –COMPARING CHINA AND
U.S. IP PRACTICES FROM IDEA SELECTION TO PATENT MONETIZATION 174 (2016).
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certain connectors, while double-lined arrows are main elements of
Claim 1. In Figure 1 for this article, for the purpose of clarity, we use
each color to represent each main element of the claim. For example,
we use thin, single-lined arrows to represent the first main element of
Claim 1, double-lined arrows for the second main element, triple-lined
arrows for the third main element, and thick, single-lined arrows for
the last main element.

Figure 1. Schematic representation of Claim 1 in its original unaltered
written form.

Furthermore, following the steps detailed by Tao Zhang et al., one
can remove boxes or shapes that appear redundant or unnecessarily
narrows to simply the claim structure to the most relevant key elements.
This way, the claim becomes more generic and thus can be more easily
compared with other claims. Specifically, we use the following
conversion relationships i) through iv), where “=>” means “to be
replaced by”:
i) display device => display
ii) uncovering the 2nd display area to activate the 2nd
display area => uncovering to activate the 2nd area
iii) closing the 1st housing over the display device to cover
the 2nd display area and place the display device in a 1st
mode of reduced power consumption wherein the 1st
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display area is visible and is active => closing the 1st
housing over the 2nd area to cause the 1st mode
iv) closing a 2nd housing over the display device to cover the
1st display area and to place the display device in a 2nd
mode of reduced power consumption => closing a 2nd
housing over the 1st area to cause the 2nd mode.

Figure 2. Schematics of the bare-bone structure of an exemplary patent
Claim 1.

After performing such simplification, one should be able to arrive
at the following bare-bone simple structure for Claim 1:
Claim 1:
(A) method, comprising:
opening (a) 1st housing (attached to) (a) display (with) (a) 1st
area, (a) 2nd area, (a) 1st mode (wherein) (the) 1st area is visible and
active, (and) (a) 2nd mode;
uncovering (to activate) (the) 2nd area;
closing (the) 1st housing (over) (the) 2nd area (to cause) (the) 1st
mode; (and)
closing (a) 2nd housing (over) (the) 1st area (to cause) (the) 2nd
mode.
Such simplified bare-bone claim structure can be represented by
the claim schematics depicted in Figure 2. With a detailed studying of
such schematics, one can easily find out whether there are additional
ways to further simplify the claim, and whether there are any missing
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elements or mistakes in claim structure. From such clear schematics,
one can easily compare claims and determine which step(s) are the
novel portions, and which part(s) overlap with pre-existing prior art
(i.e., documents, patent applications, or product features). In addition,
it becomes easier to determine whether subsequent products infringe
the claimed inventions.
On the other hand, if patent drafters prefer to write a more
complicated claim structure, they can easily expand each box in Figure
2 and change the simplified bare-bone Claim 1 to a more complex
original Claim 1 by using the reverse conversion relationships defined
in the above bullet points i) through iv).
To further illustrate that such claim structure works for various
types of patents, we will deep dive into a few additional examples.
Besides the process claim for a software invention in the above, we’ll
also look at an apparatus claim, a hardware invention, and a
pharmaceutical invention.
B. Example #2: An Apparatus Claim
For simplicity, we will use the same patent discussed above, U.S.
Patent 7,126,588, “Multiple mode display apparatus,” and look at its
Claim 12 as an example.
Claim 12:
(An) apparatus comprising:
(a) first housing (having) (a) first edge, (the) first housing
comprising (a) display device (having) (a) first display area (and) (a)
second display area;
(a) second housing (pivotally attached with) (said) first housing
(proximate) (said) first edge (in) (a) first closed position (substantially
coplanar with) (the) first housing (wherein) (the) second display area
(is placed in) (a) mode of reduced power consumption (and) (is)
visually (obscured by) (the) second housing (but) (the) first display area
(is) visible (and) (is) activated to display output, (the) second housing
(pivotally displaceable) (to) (a) first open position (wherein) (the) first
display area (and) (the) second display area (are) both visible (and)
(are) both activated (to) display output; (and)
(a) third housing (pivotally attached) (with) (said) second housing
(displaceable to) (a) second closed position (substantially coplanar
with) (the) first housing (wherein) (the) first display area (and) (the)
second display area (are) both covered (and) (are) both deactivated (to)
display output, (the) third housing (displaceable to) (a) second open
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position (wherein) at least (the) first display area (is) visible (and) (is)
activated (to) display output.
Using the principles discussed above, one can easily simplify this
Claim 12 to a bare-bone structure, which makes comparison to prior
arts and determination of infringement extremely straightforward.
We’ll leave such a task to readers as a follow up exercise.
C. Example #3: A Hardware Claim
Next, we will take a look at a hardware invention with a very early
priority date, Claim 1 of U.S. Patent 4,327,459, “Combined steam and
vacuum cleaner,” as an example.
Claim 1: (A) portable steam cleaning machine comprising, (in
combination),
(an) electrolytic generator (for) generating steam, (said) generator
consisting (of)
(a pair of) spaced carbon rods,
(a) sealed receptacle (for) containing (said) carbon rods,
(said) receptacle (having) (an) inlet port (and) (an) outlet port,
(a) positive displacement pump (having) (an) inlet port (and)
(an) outlet port,
(a) tank (for) holding (a) liquid solution, tubular means (for)
interconnecting (said) tank (and) (said) inlet port (of) (said) pump,
tubular means (for) interconnecting (said) outlet port (of)
(said) pump (and) (said) inlet port (of) (said) receptacle,
tubular nozzle means (including) tubular means (having)
(one) end (connected to) (said) outlet port (of) (said) receptacle,
(and)
electrical means (for) simultaneously energizing (said)
carbon rods (and) (said) pump, (whereby) liquid (from) (said) tank
(is) fed (by) (said) pump (into) (said) receptacle (to) contact both
(of) (said) carbon rods (and) close (an) electrical circuit (for)
(said) electrolytic generator (for) producing substantially instant
steam (to be) discharged (from) (said) nozzle means (upon) (a)
surface (to be) cleaned.
D. Example #4: A Software Claim
Next, we will take a look at a software invention with an early
priority date, Claim 1 of U.S. Patent 5,566,134, “Digital computer
algorithm for processing sonar signals,” as an example.
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Claim 1: (A) method (in) which (one or more) input spectra (in) digital
form, which (are) formed (from) associated time-segments (of) (a)
voltage-vs.-time representation of a real-time signal, (are) analyzed
(for) persistent signal content (and) (are) converted (to) digital data that
(are) representative (of) (such) persistent signal content (for) display
(upon) (a) display system, (the) method comprising (the) steps (of):
A. performing frequency analysis (on) each one (of) a series (of)
time segments (of) (a) voltage-vs.-time representation of a real-time
signal (to) produce, (a) digital power spectrum (for) generating a series
(of) digital power spectra (corresponding to) (the) series (of) timesegments;
B. generating (a) preliminary estimate (of) regular spectral
features (possibly due to signals) (by) integrating successive ones (of)
(said) digital power spectra, (as) they (are) available (after) (said)
frequency analysis, (into) (an) integrated ALI (Automatic-LineIntegrator) buffer (in) (a) digital computer using (an) ALI algorithm
(of) (a) stored program;
C. assigning ABTs (Automatic-Band-Trackers) (in) (said) digital
computer (to) detect, follow (in) frequency (and) enhance (any) lines
(or) line-sets present (in) (one or more) (of) (said) digital power spectra,
in response (to) (an) operator-request (or) (to) internal control;
D. combining (the) enhanced lines (or) line-sets (from) (said)
ABTs (and) other sources;
E. displaying (said) combined enhanced lines (or) line-sets (in)
(an) appropriate visual display.
E. Example #5: A Pharmaceutical Claim
Next, we will take a look at a pharmaceutical invention which is
still active and thus more representative of modern claim drafting
styles, Claim 1 of U.S. Patent 7,790,677, “Insulin production methods
and pro-insulin constructs,” as an example.
Claim 1: (A) composition comprising (a) peptide comprising:
B chain (–)
RREAEALQVGQVELGGGPGAGSLOPLALEGSLQAR (SEQ ID
NO: 32)(–)
A chain,
(wherein) (said) A chain (and) (said) B chain (are) native
human insulin chains.
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As can be seen from the above five examples, which cover various
type of technology and complexity of claims, all or nearly all can be
represented using the structure described at the beginning of Section
III.
IV.

USING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO ASSIST
STANDARDIZATION OF CLAIM STRUCTURE

The count of the present library of granted patents already
numbers close to ten million as of the time of this writing. While it
might be straightforward to retroactively change all patents within the
library, changing the scope of those patent claims without the
knowledge or permission of the patentee would not be binding.
Nevertheless, a shadow dataset of patents can be created for reference.
Thus, natural language process algorithms can be applied to the entirety
of the patent database to parse each of the already granted claim into
its main elements, where each element consists of words or terms and
prepositions or connectors. Patents can be automatically or manually
classified, for example, into group art units, U.S. patent classifications
(UPC), international patent classifications (IPC), and/or other suitable
classification schemes. This classification can help to improve
contextual processing of terms and help to build a glossary for future
use in technologies and groups of related patents.
A. Application After Issuance
Recent rapid advancements in artificial intelligence (“AI”) can
facilitate and simplify the retroactive application of the PASS approach
described herein to the vast library of patents. The massive patent
library could be used as a massive training set for developing, refining,
and validating the machine learning algorithms on which PASS will be
built. Patentees could also be incentivized to convert their current
patent applications to the PASS system. Granted that few patents would
be able to go through the conversion under current law,46 a new
proceeding could be developed to simplify the process and allow for a
greater number of such amendments.47

46. See Jennifer R. Turchyn, Improving Patent Quality Through Post-Grant Claim
Amendments: A Comparison of European Opposition Proceedings and U.S. Post-Grant
Proceedings, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1497 (2016).
47. With only prospective applying amendments and few options for non-narrowing
amendments, the current process is far from simple. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2012).
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B. Application During Drafting
As described above, optimally, PASS could also be applied during
the drafting process (e.g., in real time). We envision that patent drafters
would be able to draft patents within a software application (e.g., a
cloud-based application or a word processing program plug-in) that
runs PASS modules, such as a PASS parser, PASS debugger, and
PASS compiler. During the drafting process, AI algorithms can be used
to aid in the selection of USPTO pre-approved key terms and
connectors based on the patentees notes or the already drafted
specifications. For example, the software would suggest likely
subsequent connector and word combinations or provide lists of
alternative terms. Algorithms can also be used to validate proposed
claims and/or elements as they are written, based on the text of the
patent itself, as well as the entirety of the known patent library. For
example, drafted claims or claim elements could be automatically
checked for consistency with other claims and the specifications,
validated against prior art, and checked for support within the figures
and detailed description. Much of this technology is already available
for drafters, however, the use of consistent terminology would make
such efforts more robust.
C. Application During Prosecution
Another application of PASS could occur during the examination
(prosecution) process. The consistency and structure provided by
PASS can facilitate use of patent office AI algorithms to quickly and
automatically check applications for issues such as antecedent basis,
clarity, written description support, indefiniteness, etc. Further, the
PASS structure can improve the ability of algorithms to assess novelty
and potentially even non-obviousness. For example, the nearly ten
million patents, vast library of computer-accessible human knowledge,
libraries of prosecution and litigation histories, and other sources of
data can provide training datasets, from which machine learning
algorithms can quickly flag likely issues and provide relevant citations
and support that could be followed up by a lean corps of human
examiners.
Of course, given candor requirements, using an AI will
dramatically increase the likelihood that the patentee will have to
disclose art that the examiner might never have become aware. Instead,
a patentee might prefer to use an alternative blackbox third-party
service that provides suggested terms without providing concomitant
information to the patentee about prior art, thus sidestepping away from
any duty-of-candor issues before the patent office and providing only
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guidance as to what terms might be problematic, not why those terms
are problematic. However, the patent office would have access to
similar technologies so the likelihood that the patentee might come
across a reference that the examiner would not is not likely.
V.

PROS AND CONS OF A PASS STANDARDIZED CLAIM
STRUCTURE – FOR EXAMINERS, PATENT DRAFTER, AND
INVENTORS

There are many benefits to a standardized claim structure. It
enables easy comparison of patent claims regardless of the source, i.e.,
the patent drafter. It facilitates comparison of patents with vast areas of
prior art literature, including those in foreign languages. It also enables
drafters to quickly see relationships between various patents within a
family and to easily distinguish new patents from older family
members or other sources in the prior art.
Examiners will be able to easily and accurately search for relevant
prior art, which will help decrease pendency and increase patent
quality. In addition, some of the examination process can be further
streamlined using AI, and thus further shortening the patent process.
Competitors will be able to easily work out freedom to operate
analyses, thereby avoiding time consuming and costly litigation. And,
all stakeholders will be able to determine whether the threats of NPEs
are reasonable or beyond the scope of the presented claims and
ignorable—effectively confounding the business practices of most
trolls.
Patent drafters may worry that such standardization may make
their jobs obsolete. Instead, such standardization enables patent
drafters to focus on the most creative portion of patent drafting—
figuring out invention novelty points, and thus make their jobs even
more valued than before.
VI.

HOW TO ENABLE BROAD ADOPTION OF STANDARDIZED
CLAIM STRUCTURE?

We believe that change must start at the USPTO. The USPTO can
set up incentive programs, such as those similar to the glossary
initiative,48 where patent applications using the aforementioned
standardized claim structure can get fast tracked without paying
additional fees, or only need to pay a reduced examination fees (since
48. Glossary Pilot Program, 79 Fed. Reg. 17137 (Mar. 27, 2014). See also Glossary
Initiative, USPTO (Apr. 3, 2016), http://bit.do/USPTO_Glossary. Notably, the initiative had to be
extended as it had failed to receive even 200 applications by its first deadline. See Welcome to the
Patent Quality Summit, USPTO (Mar. 25, 2015), http://bit.do/USPTO_Patent-quality-summit.

2018]

CALL FOR STANDARDIZATION

313

efficiency will be higher), or both. Additionally, regulatory change is
necessary if we were to allow for a readily accessible post-facto
rephrasing of all granted patent claims.
Inventors and patent drafters might worry that prior art is too easy
to find using such standardized claim structure and thus reduce their
chance of obtaining a granted patent. To address this concern, we
recommend the United States adopts aspects of the China Utility Model
patent.
As discussed in the book MINING IDEAS FOR DIAMONDS,49 a
Chinese utility model allows for a two-tiered patent system. Moreover,
the evaluation report of patent (“ERP”) that accompanies the utility
model can be used in litigation cases. ERPs are relatively easy to obtain
and easy to defend. This is because only one or two pieces of prior art,
which must be references from the same art of technology field, can be
used to attack the inventiveness or otherwise invalidate a utility model
patent application.50
As a reward for such clarity, perhaps prior art should also be
similar to the Chinese utility model’s ERP, and generally be confined
to a smaller number of references from the same technology field. This
may force inventors to file more patent applications to protect their
inventions due to the narrower-yet-clearer claim structure and may
later result in lower number of invalidated patents and reduce both
patent examination and patent drafting costs. Overall, it will be a good
outcome for the entire patent industry.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. patent system suffers from a number of ills, many of
them associated with the continued concerns associated with NPEs,
PAEs, or other entities exhibiting trolling behavior. In the past, these
bad actors have upended the patent system to a degree that is heretofore
unprecedented, resulting in a cheapening of the entire system, an
inhibition of innovation, and a number of changes to the patent system
driven solely by removing the threat of trolls.
None of these attempted changes have been very successful in
relieving the threat of trolls for all stakeholders. Not only has this
continued to cost many of the industries that rely on the patent system
(surprisingly, not the biotechnology industry)51 but it has also forced
49.
50.
51.

ZHANG & FANG, supra note 45, at 28-31.
Id. at 28.
Dov Greenbaum, Patent Sharing in Biotechnology, in PATENT PLEDGES: GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES ON PATENT LAW’S PRIVATE ORDERING FRONTIER 56 (Jorge L. Contreras &
Meredith Jacob, eds., 2017).
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many stakeholders to look elsewhere to protect their innovation (e.g.,
through the use of trade secret).
We propose a new tool to fight trolls and otherwise raise the
quality of patents, a central issue of the current USPTO. By employing
AI, NLP, and machine learning to create standardized claim terms,
syntax, and format, we can create an easy to use system that promotes
easy-to-understand, easy-to-parse, and easy-to-assess patent claims.
Standardization is an important if not central concept in all emerging
technologies; why not enforce it in the regime that protects those
technologies as well?

